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BREXIT AND ARTICLE 50 TEU: A CONSTITUTIONALIST READING 
PIET EECKHOUT AND ELENI FRANTZIOU* 
Abstract 
This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 
50 TEU for the EU. It argues that it is essential to read Article 50 in light of the 
features of the Treaty of which it forms part together with its drafting context, that 
of the Convention on the Future of Europe, as well as the substantive protections 
of EU constitutional law. The article demonstrates that important constitutional 
constraints are in place in EU law, which can affect the most significant debates 
in the withdrawal process, namely: the manner in which notification to withdraw 
from the Union is given; the revocability of a decision to withdraw; and the legal 
basis and content of the withdrawal agreement. Most importantly, a reading of 
Article 50 informed by key constitutional features of the EU legal order stipulates 
clear duties for the EU to respect the UK’s constitutional requirements and to 
protect, in any eventual agreement, acquired rights for EU citizens in the UK and 
UK citizens in the EU, by emphasizing the illegality of a non-compliant 
withdrawal agreement from the EU perspective. 
1. Introduction
Never before has a provision of EU law become so well known in such a short space 
of time as Article 50 TEU. In a seismic vote on 23 June 2016, the British people 
decided with a clear but by no means overwhelming majority that the United 
Kingdom (UK) should leave the EU. The UK Government and Parliament have now 
decided to give effect to that vote by formally notifying the EU of the UK's intention 
to withdraw in a letter delivered to the President of European Council on 29 March 
2017.1 
Article 50 TEU itself is a sparsely worded provision, which raises more questions 
than it answers, and which is of course wholly untested.2 Now that the withdrawal 
process has formally commenced, it is clear that in addition to any concerns it may 
raise from the viewpoint of national law,3 it will be governed by the law of the EU in 
a number of ways. This article advocates and articulates a constitutionalist 
interpretation of Article 50 TEU. Our overarching argument is that withdrawal 
requires compliance with EU constitutional law, which comprises respect for national 
constitutional requirements as well as key EU values, such as democracy, the rule of 
law, the protection of fundamental rights including non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, and EU citizenship. 
* Respectively Faculty of Laws, UCL and Westminster Law School. The authors are grateful for
comments on an earlier draft by Paul Craig, Federico Ortino, Thomas Streinz, and UCL Laws faculty, 
and for the support of the UCL European Institute. 
1 See European Council Press Releases and Statements, “Statement by the European Council (Art. 50) 
on the UK notification”, No. 159/17, 29 Mar 2017, <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/03/29-euco-50-statement-uk-notification/> (last visited 3 Apr. 2017). 
2 On the difference with prior withdrawals, see Tatham, “Don't mention divorce at the wedding, 
darling!: EU accession and withdrawal after Lisbon” in Eeckhout, Biondi, and Ripley (Eds.), EU Law 
After Lisbon (OUP, 2012), p. 148. 
3 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) (“Miller 
Divisional Court”); R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5 (“Miller Supreme Court”). 
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A constitutionalist reading has significant implications for the nature and conduct 
of the negotiations, but also – should an agreement be reached - for the content of the 
withdrawal agreement and the shape of the future relationship between the UK and 
the Union. This article demonstrates the need for considered assessment of these 
commitments on both sides of the Channel - and not just negotiation through 
intergovernmental bargaining. A constitutionalist reading of Article 50 also builds on 
recent appeals for a “kinder, gentler Brexit”.4 It illustrates that a non-punishing 
approach towards withdrawal is not merely a question of the Union’s charitable 
disposition but that it is, rather, mandated by the Union’s obligation to respect 
constitutional requirements of a withdrawing State, the rights of individuals, and its 
own very values. 
Indeed, there is no denying that the withdrawal of one of its largest Member States 
is a moment of crisis for the Union and a difficult test for the effectiveness of its 
institutions. A return to functional intergovernmentalism without sincere, explicit, and 
consistent regard for the constitutional commitments made in the Treaties would 
deeply undermine the idea that the EU is built not just upon mutual interests, but also 
the rule of law. By contrast, a constitutionalist approach towards the negotiations is an 
opportunity to affirm that the structures built over the last sixty years have truly come 
to constitute a new mode of post-State organization, premised on cooperation, 
genuine respect for common values and fundamental rights, and a supranational 
citizenship, which could see the Union through a new era following the UK’s 
withdrawal.5 In other words, a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 is the only 
possible reading of the provision that enables the EU to preserve its sui generis 
character as a new legal order that creates rights and obligations for its subjects, and 
remains a significant part of their legal heritage.6 
The article is structured as follows. First, we further articulate why a 
constitutionalist reading of Article 50 is essential by drawing support both from the 
drafting context in which the provision was inserted into the treaties and the very 
nature of the withdrawal process (section 2). We then discuss in more detail what the 
drafting context of this provision reveals about the political intentions that shaped it 
(section 3), before going on to apply these findings to the different aspects of Article 
50 itself. We address, in particular, the necessity of withdrawal in accordance with 
UK constitutional law and the need for the EU to respect this; the nature and 
timeframe of the negotiations and agreement; and the rights of individuals and 
national and supranational parliaments in the process (section 4). 
2. The need for a constitutionalist reading
From the perspective of EU law, it is clear that Article 50 TEU is situated in a 
quintessentially constitutional place: as the Court famously put it in Les Verts, the 
Treaties are the Union’s “constitutional charter”.7 Still, as Dieter Grimm has argued, 
EU law suffers from a problem of over-constitutionalization,8 insofar as it labels 
“constitutional” provisions that do not fulfil the functions of constitutional law, 
namely to safeguard the proper process of government. 9  It must therefore be 
emphasized that the argument for a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 does not 
4 Weiler, “Editorial: The case for a kinder, gentler Brexit”, 15 I-CON (2017). 
5 See further Fabbrini, “How Brexit opens a window of opportunity for Treaty reform in the EU”, 
(2016) Delors Institut/Bertelsmann Stiftung: Spotlight Europe, <www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/spotlight_europe_01_2016.pdf> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017). 
6 Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, EU:C:1963:1. 
7 Case C-294/83, Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para 23. 
8 Grimm, “The democratic costs of constitutionalisation: The European case”, 21 ELJ (2015), 469-471. 
9 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003), pp. 5-7. 
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stem from a mere reference to the ECJ’s case law. The need for such a reading 
becomes evident as soon as the provision is considered in the light of the historical 
context of its drafting and the nature of withdrawal from the Union, more broadly. 
As Kostakopoulou has put it, withdrawal is “anchored” in the constitutional 
character of the Union as a freely associative, rather than coercive, project.10 Whereas 
it was the Lisbon Treaty that ultimately brought it within EU law, the right of 
voluntary withdrawal was negotiated within the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
and formed part of the Constitutional Treaty.11 The Constitution’s withdrawal clause 
was adopted without any fundamental changes by the Lisbon Intergovernmental 
Conference, becoming Article 50 TEU.12 This historical context constitutes a first, 
immediate reason for a constitutionalist reading. The fact that Article 50 enters the EU 
legal order at this constitutional moment is significant. It coincides with the point at 
which the Union attempted to draw up a framework of governance that fulfilled 
aspirations of further political integration and was premised on common values, a 
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, and a commitment to the principles of 
democracy and the rule of law. In this sense, Article 50 has an “inherently specific” 
constitutional context, which sheds light on its interpretation.13 
Indeed, Article 50 is of a constitutional character not only in formal but also in 
substantive terms. To paraphrase Bruce Ackerman: when considering what the 
constitution of the EU actually constitutes,14 it would be impossible not to make 
reference to membership of and distancing from that Union, i.e. who takes part therein 
and who does not. One can hardly imagine provisions that are more “constitutional” 
in character than those concerning the make-up, objectives, membership, and 
withdrawal from the EU. In regulating the latter process, Article 50 is directly 
constitutive of what the EU is. The interpretation of Article 50 affects the Union’s 
very identity as a constitutional order committed to the values of “respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”.15 To adopt any interpretation 
thereof other than a constitutionalist one would amount to an implicit refutation of 
that identity - one that distinguishes the Union from other international 
organizations.16 
The need for a constitutionalist reading is confirmed by the fact that Article 50 
does not operate in a vacuum. It regulates withdrawal from a series of specific 
protections guaranteed by EU law over several decades, so that its terms must be 
assessed in light of the spirit of the TEU and the Union’s most basic commitments. It 
is indeed obvious that a national decision such as Brexit and the process of 
withdrawal that it triggers raise concerns about the safeguarding of the values 
mentioned above.17 For example, extricating the UK from the acquis communautaire 
is a complex, wide-ranging and intrusive legal exercise, which raises questions of 
respect for constitutional guarantees relating to acquired rights and the rule of law. 
                                                
10 Kostakopoulou, “Brexit, voice and loyalty: Reflections on Article 50 TEU”, 41 EL Rev. (2016), 488. 
11 The right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union was initially envisaged as Art. 46 in Ch. X of the 
first part of the Constitution entitled “Membership of the Union”. It was renumbered Art. 59 in the 
Constitution’s final draft. 
12 The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 21-22 June 2007, in which the 
main reforms to the Constitutional Treaty are discussed mention the withdrawal clause only in passing: 
see Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 20 July 2007, 11177/1/07 REV 1, para 16. 
13 Dowdle and Wilkinson, “On the limits of constitutional liberalism: In search of a constitutional 
reflexivity”, (2015) NUS Law Working Paper, 6-7. 
14 Ackerman, “The Storrs lectures: Discovering the constitution”, 93 Yale Law Journal (1984), 1040. 
15 Art. 2 TEU. 
16 Case C-26/72, Van Gend en Loos. 
17 See Letsas, “The Constitution and the folly of majoritarianism”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 20 
Feb. 2017, <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/20/george-letsas-the-constitution-and-the-folly-of-
majoritarianism/>  (last visited 10 Mar. 2017). 
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One need look only at the debate about safeguarding current rights to work and rights 
of residence of EU citizens in the UK, or instead using them as a “bargaining chip” in 
the Brexit negotiations.18 
The degree to which the rights of citizens are at stake in the Article 50 process 
puts the need for a constitutionalist reading most sharply into focus. These rights are 
not confined to human rights.  The direct effect of EU law, be it in the form of 
provisions in the Treaties or EU legislation, is an enormous rights-generating factory, 
as the Court of Justice famously found in Van Gend en Loos.19 Often, EU law creates 
directly effective rights and duties, enforceable in national law, without even using a 
rights vocabulary. Rights may simply be created through the imposition of 
obligations, on the EU institutions,20 the Member States,21 or private actors.22 Take a 
principle as fundamental as the free movement of goods. The relevant TFEU 
provisions do not, in their terms, confer any rights to free trade on private parties; they 
impose obligations on the Member States. But the direct effect and primacy of these 
provisions mean that both individuals and companies have an enforceable right to 
“free cross-border trade” which trumps any inconsistent national law.23 
This system of rights is not a theoretical construct. It is part and parcel of the daily 
lives of millions of people, both in the UK and elsewhere in the EU. Indeed, the rights 
that EU law generates are beyond enumeration, or even classification. They are 
scattered throughout all EU policies and thousands of pieces of legislation.24 What 
follows is definitely incomplete and strictly illustrative. There are rights to free trade, 
in goods and services;25 rights to free movement of capital and free establishment;26 
rights to free movement of persons, accompanied by rights to work, to reside, not to 
be discriminated against on grounds of nationality.27 There are broader rights to 
equality; 28  political rights; 29  employment and social rights; 30  consumer rights; 31 
environmental rights; 32  rights to agricultural subsidies; 33  rights to have foreign 
judgments enforced;34 rights of immigration and family reunification;35 rights to 
                                                
18 See Mantouvalou, “EU citizens as bargaining chips”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 14 July 2016, 
<www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/14/virginia-mantouvalou-eu-citizens-as-bargaining-chips/> 
(last visited 10 Dec. 2016). 
19 Case C-26/72, Van Gend en Loos. 
20 Perhaps most illustratively, see the creation of rights in the Kadi litigation: Joined Cases C-402 & 
415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:461; Joined Cases C-584, 
593, & 595/10 P, Commission and Others v. Kadi, EU:C:2013:518. 
21 Case C-26/72, Van Gend en Loos. 
22 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch, EU:C:1974:140; Case C-415/93, Bosman, EU:C:1995:463; Case 
C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, EU:C:1976:56. 
23 See Case C-8/74, Dassonville, EU:C:1974:82; Case C-171/11, Fra.bo, EU:C:2012:453. 
24 Andrew Duff notes that over 1200 regulations and directives currently apply to the UK: Duff, “After 
Brexit: A new Association Agreement between Britain and Europe”, Policy Network Paper, Oct. 2016, 
<www.policy-network.net/publications_download.aspx?ID=9435> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016), 8. 
25 Arts. 34 and 56 TFEU respectively. 
26 Arts. 56 and 49 TFEU respectively. 
27 Arts. 45, 21, 18 TFEU; Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 Apr. 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, O.J. 2011, L 141/1. 
28 Arts. 21-26 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. 2012, C 326/02 (EUCFR); 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16. 
29 Arts. 20 and 22 TFEU. 
30 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, O.J. 1989, C 120/52; Arts. 27 et 
seq. EUCFR. 
31 Art. 12 TFEU; Art. 38 EUCFR. 
32 Art. 191 TFEU; Art. 37 EUCFR. 
33 Art. 171 TFEU. 
34 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on   jurisdiction   and   the   recognition   and   
enforcement   of   judgments   in   civil   and   commercial matters, O.J. 2011, L 12/1 (“Brussels 
Regulation”). 
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privacy and data protection.36 Overarching all of these rights is the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which proclaims a number of them to be fundamental and 
ensures their respect within the scope of application of EU law.37 
Brexit does not mean that all these rights will be lost. The UK Government 
proposes to put a Great Repeal Bill before Parliament which, contrary to its title, 
would keep most EU law on the statute book as a post-Brexit starting-point.38  
However, some rights will inevitably be lost, as the Miller litigation established, for 
example the right to vote for the European Parliament, and to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament.39 Other rights are contingent on how the future 
relationship is constructed.  That relationship can never keep all rights resulting from 
full membership intact, or else Brexit would make no sense. Given the UK's dualist 
system, the rights that do survive will be rights under international law. They may be 
incorporated into domestic law, but will no longer benefit from the direct effect and 
primacy of EU law.40 
Moreover, in light of the uncertainty inherent in the political nature of the 
withdrawal process, which is one of negotiation, many EU law rights are rendered 
vulnerable. This is the case for those rights which cannot be maintained in the absence 
of their recognition by all Member States, for example rights of free movement, 
including those of UK citizens to work and reside in other Member States. What 
could also be lost is a certain level of entrenchment of EU law rights, particularly but 
not exclusively those which flow from the EU Treaties and the Charter. That is a 
function of the high political threshold for obtaining any amendment, let alone 
termination of such rights: all Member States have to agree, in accordance with their 
constitutional requirements.41 Even rights which merely result from EU secondary 
legislation may be more difficult to amend than rights conferred by domestic 
legislation.42 
This entrenchment has a strong counter-majoritarian streak. For example, even if 
many EU citizens who have benefited from free movement may be regarded as part of 
globalization's elites, they do constitute a minority in fundamental rights terms. The 
Brexit referendum campaign, vote, and subsequent developments pose a threat to their 
rights in a variety of ways, which we consider in further detail in following sections. 
The impact of withdrawal on rights, particularly of those people living in the UK, but 
also of UK citizens in other Member States, commands an understanding of Article 50 
                                                                                                                                       
35 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr. 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, O.J. 2004, L 229/35. 
36 Arts. 7-8 EUCFR; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, O.J. 1995, L 281/31. 
37 Art. 51  EUCFR; Art. 6 TEU. 
38 Department for Exiting the European Union White Paper, “Legislating for the United Kingdom's 
Withdrawal from the European Union”, Cm. 9446, Mar. 2017, 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604516/Great_repeal_bill_wh
ite_paper_accessible.pdf> (last visited 3 Apr. 2017); see also Douglas-Scott, “The ‘Great Repeal Bill’: 
Constitutional chaos and constitutional crisis?”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 10 Oct. 2016, 
<www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/10/sionaidh-douglas-scott-the-great-repeal-bill-constitutional-
chaos-and-constitutional-crisis/> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016); Simpson-Caird, “Legislating for Brexit: 
The Great Repeal Bill”, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 7793, 23 Feb. 2017, 
<www.researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7793/CBP-7793.pdf> (last visited 9 Mar. 
2017). 
39 Miller Divisional Court, para 61; Miller Supreme Court, paras. 69-72. 
40 For a detailed analysis of the legal effects of withdrawal on different types of EU law rights in the 
UK, see Łazowski, “EU withdrawal: Good business for British business?”, 21 EPL (2016), 121-126.   
41 Art. 48 TEU. 
42 McCrea, “Forward or back: The future of European integration and the impossibility of the status 
quo”, 2017 ELJ, forthcoming. 
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that takes into account the role of rights in the EU legal order. The conferral of rights 
is a central feature of the EU's “constitution” and its construction over the years.43 It 
has in turn been a key aspect of membership of the Union. 
What does a constitutionalist reading entail then?  The answer to that question 
follows in part below, when we explore some of the key questions and issues that 
Article 50 presents (section 4). In more general terms, however, we agree with Streinz 
that the Brexit process must first of all be a cooperative one, since the duty of 
cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU continues to bind the EU institutions, the 
UK, and the other Member States, for as long as Brexit is not complete.44 The guiding 
principle in the negotiations for a withdrawal agreement must therefore be respect for 
EU constitutional law, and the rule of law and the protection of rights are paramount 
in this regard. A constitutionalist reading of Article 50 also requires respect for other 
EU values, such as democracy, which points to the role of parliaments in the process.  
It further needs to be consistent with the principles governing the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States, including questions of legal 
basis. A constitutionalist reading also means that, when it comes to defining the EU's 
future relationship with the UK, as a non-Member State, the negotiations need to take 
account of the core objectives of EU external action. These include the promotion of 
the EU’s values and interests; the protection of its citizens and of human rights; and 
free and fair trade.45 
Our constitutionalist reading stands in contrast with a purely intergovernmental or 
internationalist reading. It is also one which is not focused on a purely textual 
interpretation of Article 50.  That provision is an important constitutional guide to the 
withdrawal process. Its authors, however, could not have foreseen the range of issues 
and questions which a specific withdrawal (Brexit) may throw up. EU constitutional 
principles and provisions must fill the gaps, and may even modify what under a plain 
reading seems incontrovertible - for example the firmness of the two-year deadline for 
the withdrawal agreement (see section 4.3.3. below). 
 
 
3. Lessons from the travaux 
 
It is often said that Article 50 was never intended to be used,46 and that it was hastily 
drafted. However, the records of the Convention on the Future of Europe show that it 
was seriously considered and debated. Since the Article 50 process is unprecedented, 
an adequate constitutional analysis must take account of the information regarding the 
content and goals of this provision that emerges from its drafting context. 
Furthermore, from a constitutional perspective, the intentions of the drafters are 
significant and are likely to play a role in the interpretation of Article 50 should it 
come before the ECJ. While in the past the Court made use of a teleological 
methodology that did not place emphasis on the drafters’ actual intentions, as 
Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons have explained, this was largely the case because the 
travaux of the founding Treaties were not available.47 As a conscious effort was made 
to render the consultation and drafting process of the Constitution for Europe as open 
and transparent as possible, references to the travaux are now justified and 
                                                
43 Weiler, “The transformation of Europe”, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), esp. 2417-19. See also Stone 
Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP, 2004), p. 53. 
44 Streinz, “Cooperative Brexit: Giving back control over trade policy”, (2017) I-CON, forthcoming. 
45 See Art. 3(5) TEU. 
46 O’Brien, “Article 50 was designed ‘NEVER to be used’ - says the man who wrote the EU divorce 
clause”, Sunday Express, 23 July 2016, <www.express.co.uk/news/world/692065/Article-50-NEVER-
to-be-used-Europe-Brexit-Italy-Prime-Minister> (last visited 10 Dec. 2016). 
47 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, “To say what the law of the EU is: Methods of interpretation and the 
European Court of Justice”, (2013) EUI Working Paper AEL 2013/09, 21. 
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constitutionally welcome.48 Indeed, in light of the fact that many provisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty (including Art. 50) were copied into the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ 
has become more receptive to interpretations based on preparatory documents and 
these are likely to play an important role in the future.49 
While there is no explanatory memorandum or official guide to Article 50, the 
debate about its terms can be meaningfully reconstructed from the proposed 
amendments. They do not answer all interpretative questions, but at a minimum 
constitute evidence of some of the main concerns and political intentions that 
surrounded the provision’s creation. The travaux highlight that issues concerning 
rights, legal bases, and institutional balance were considered, thus making the case for 
a constitutionalist reading stronger. They are also particularly useful in shedding light 
on the meaning of one of the most central questions in the Brexit debate: what 
constitutes a Member State’s valid decision to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements and to what extent the Article 50 
process is dependent on that decision. 
The vagueness that characterizes Article 50 today was linked to the delegates’ 
inability to reach agreement concerning the strictness of the withdrawal process and, 
hence, on a more precise wording for the provision itself. This can be attributed to the 
very different perspectives on the goals and nature of the Constitutional Treaty. The 
clause was inserted in light of the fact that the UK disagreed with the political 
aspiration of a closer union that the Constitution set in motion.50 In turn, Member 
States that supported the constitutionalizing project at the time, such as Germany 
(represented in the negotiations by then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer), actively 
opposed its insertion.51 That opposition was shared by most of the other founding 
States, as well as by the EU institutions.52 Notably, a group of representatives from 
the European Parliament proposed that, if the provision were maintained, further 
safeguards should be added to ensure that it does not privilege the withdrawing 
State.53 They argued, for example, that the article should balance the ability to leave 
with a power for the Union to expel a Member State.54 Their reasoning was that “such 
a parallel right of the Union to expel Members would also reduce the risk of political 
blackmailing through the means of exit threats”.55 
Other important concerns raised in the course of the drafting of the withdrawal 
clause were the maintenance of individual rights, the protection of Union values, and 
respect for international law.56 One of the most interesting suggestions was the 
introduction of an Article 50bis, which would create an alternative form of 
membership of the Union for those members that wished to remain closely linked to 
the EU but did not share the political ambition of further unification, such as the UK. 
The proposal, made by Andrew Duff, Lamberto Dini, Paul Helminger, Rein Lang, 
and Lord Maclennan, would essentially have allowed for associate (rather than full) 
membership of the Union, entailing economic cooperation without an “ever closer 
union” in other fields.57 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 24. 
50 See List of proposed amendments to the text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, “Part I of the Constitution: Article 59”, 39, <european-
convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/pdf/46/global46.pdf> (last visited 19 Dec. 2016) 
51 Ibid., 18. 
52 See ibid; e.g. the Dutch, Portuguese, Luxembourgish, German, Greek, and Austrian representatives 
had sought its deletion. 
53 Ibid., 5. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 7. 
56 Ibid., 24, 20 and 26. 
57 Ibid., 8. 
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A series of other amendments intended to render withdrawal more cumbersome 
were proposed by Dominique de Villepin, who represented France. 58  He had 
suggested that withdrawal should be made conditional on a form of “irreconcilable 
differences” between the withdrawing State and the EU following a Treaty change 
and that it should be required that a solution be sought within the Council first. He 
also asked that a limitation period be introduced before re-accession.59 Although he 
only suggested a two-year period, this seems to have been inspired by Alain 
Lamassoure’s vision of the Constitutional Treaty, which had a federalist character, 
strictly regulating withdrawal and including a 20-year limitation clause before re-
accession.60 Of the initial accounts of Article 50, though, most delegates seemed to 
favour Robert Badinter’s proposal, which was more pragmatic.61 Still, the more 
onerous clauses Badinter had proposed, such as the payment of damages to the Union 
by the withdrawing State for any losses incurred through the negotiations, were not 
inserted.62 
It follows that Article 50(1) is the key to the withdrawal process: provided there is 
a valid constitutional decision to withdraw, a Member State can notify the European 
Council of its decision to do so under Article 50(2), and then negotiate its future 
relationship with the Union (Art. 50(3)). This is not to say that there are no limitations 
on what can be negotiated as part of a future relationship on the part of the EU, but 
EU law clearly recognizes this freedom for the withdrawing State. The withdrawal 
process envisaged in Article 50 is not subject to specific conditions. It is indeed 
possible for a State to leave without any agreement at all. 
The fact that clauses for further limiting the provision had been proposed in the 
negotiations and enjoyed some support nonetheless merits further discussion. The text 
of Article 50 was in fact changed substantially from the first63 to the final draft of the 
Constitution.64 While the first draft did not contain any limitations on the withdrawing 
State’s re-accession to the Union, two important provisos were added in the 
Constitution’s final draft: first, that the two-year period for the negotiations could 
only be extended by unanimity (Art. 59(3)); and second, that a State wishing to 
withdraw would need to make a new application for accession (Art. 59(4)). This 
suggests that the broad discretion allowed in respect of the unilateral withdrawal 
decision in the provision’s opening paragraph was intended to be counter-balanced, 
first, by conditions intended to prevent the withdrawing State holding the Union 
hostage in the negotiations and, second, by the insertion of disincentives for using 
Article 50. Both of these restrictions were intended to guard against the possibility of 
triggering Article 50 in a politically opportunistic fashion, or by “opponents of Europe 
in the Member States” - a key concern for those who opposed its insertion.65 
These aspects of the genesis of Article 50 are relevant to the contrast between a 
constitutionalist and an intergovernmental or internationalist understanding of the 
withdrawal process. Prior to the entry into force of Article 50, majority opinion held 
that withdrawal from the EU was possible, but only through a consensual process 
                                                
58 Ibid., 4. 
59 Ibid. 
60  European Convention, “The European Union: Four possible models”, contribution by Mr 
Lamassoure, member of the Convention, 3 Sept. 2002, CONV 235/02. 
61 Tatham, op. cit. supra note 2, 148. 
62 European Convention, “A European Constitution”, contribution from M. Robert Badinter, alternate 
member of the Convention, 30 Sept. 2002, CONV 317/02. 
63 European Convention, “Document from the Praesidium: Preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty”, 28 
Oct. 2002, CONV 369/02. 
64 European Convention, “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, 18 Jul. 2003, CONV 
850/03. 
65 List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 45. 
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under Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).66 The 
differences between such an interpretation and a constitutionalist reading are arguably 
significant. For example, on the question whether the Article 50 process is the only 
permissible Brexit route, Article 54 VCLT supplies a negative answer, as it juxtaposes 
withdrawal by consent of all the parties with withdrawal in conformity with the 
provisions of the treaty in issue. Article 50, by contrast, created a unilateral right, 
particularly because of the two-year cut-off to the attempt to achieve a negotiated 
withdrawal. It must indeed be emphasized that withdrawal under Article 50 is an 
“unfettered” right for the withdrawing State:67 it imposes neither an obligation to 
reach agreement nor, even, an obligation to negotiate. If the withdrawing State chose 
to leave the Union without doing either, it could do so, and would be considered 
withdrawn two years after notification. 
The EU constitution therefore protects the right of withdrawal better than 
international law does. The constitutional concept is that exit from the EU polity must 
always be possible - and that it must allow sufficient freedom, without any necessary 
lock-ins of a future relationship.68 We do not contest the merits of that concept.69 At 
the same time, though, a “no-deal” withdrawal clearly offends all that EU 
constitutional law holds dear, in terms of rights protection, the rule of law, and the 
duty of cooperation. Thus, while it may not impose an obligation on the withdrawing 
State to negotiate, Article 50 does, as Hillion has put it, impose a “best endeavours 
obligation” on the EU to negotiate and reach an agreement.70 The counterpart to the 
unilateral right of withdrawal must indeed be to read Article 50 as embodying an 
exceptionally strong preference for a negotiated, orderly, and well transitioned 
withdrawal, over the “no-deal” outcome, at least on the part of the EU. This is in line 
both with the Council’s guidelines following the UK’s notification71 and, more 
broadly, with the way in which the EU generally handles constitutional crises. The 
history of those crises shows that, invariably, the EU goes to great lengths to find a 
negotiated settlement of some kind. Instances are the social rights chapter at 
Maastricht, the creation of the euro and of Schengen, justice and home affairs 
integration, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: each accompanied with a UK 
opt-out (or a clarification in the case of the Charter). Other instances are the first Irish 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, or the Danish opt-outs. It is therefore very much 
part of the EU's constitutional ethos to resolve crises through negotiation, and we 
consider that the EU is under a constitutional obligation to do all it can to avoid a “no-
deal” Brexit.72 
 
 
                                                
66 See Tatham, op. cit. supra note 2. 
67 Hofmeister, “‘Should I stay or should I go?’ - A critical analysis of the right to withdraw from the 
EU”, 16 ELJ (2010), 592. 
68 See Kostakopoulou, op. cit. supra note 10. 
69  For debate on the merits, see Klabbers, “Continent in crisis”, 27 EJIL (2016), 553; Costa, 
“Interpreting Article 50: Exit and voice and… What about loyalty?”, (2016) EUI Working Papers 
RSCAS 2016/71. 
70 Hillion, “Leaving the European Union, the Union way: A legal analysis of Article 50”, (2016) 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies: European Policy Analysis, 2016-8, 6 
<www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/Leaving%20the%20European%20Union,%20the%20Union%20way
%20(2016-8epa).pdf> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017). See also Medhi, “Brèves observations sur la 
consecration constitutionnelle d’un droit de retrait volontaire” in Demaret, Govaere and Hanf (Eds.), 30 
Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe/30 ans d’études juridiques européennes au 
Collège d’Europe: Liber Professorum 1973/74–2003/04 (P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2005). 
71 Council of the European Union, “Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under 
Article 50 TEU”, 31 Mar. 2017, XT 21001/17, 5, para 6. 
72 This can be contrasted with the position detailed in the Guidelines, ibid., 3, para 1, emphasizing that 
there can be no “cherry picking” on the part of the UK. 
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4. The application of a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 
 
So far, our discussion has shown that the avoidance of political opportunism and the 
safeguarding of due process under national constitutional law underpinned the 
drafting of Article 50, despite the vagueness of the provision’s final text. These 
concerns and the possible implications of a constitutionally unregulated withdrawal 
need to be accommodated in the interpretation of this provision. In the remainder of 
our discussion, we analyse how the withdrawal process can in fact be carried out 
compatibly with a constitutionalist reading of Article 50. 
 
4.1. The decision to withdraw belongs to the withdrawing State, “in accordance with 
its own constitutional requirements” 
 
Article 50(1) provides that “any Member State may decide to withdraw from the 
Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. Article 50(2) adds that 
the “Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention”. As discussed earlier, in the negotiations on Article 50, the question of what 
should amount to a decision to withdraw was discussed extensively. Not only had 
there been proposals to qualify the possibility of taking that decision by making it 
dependent on Treaty change or compliance with EU values. It had also been 
suggested that the phrase “in accordance with its own constitutional requirements” 
should be removed altogether as it was not in the EU’s interest, because it entrusted it 
with the oversight of national constitutional requirements.73 The retention of this 
phrase is therefore significant. It suggests that respect for the constitutional 
requirements of a withdrawing State, whatever these may be, must underpin the 
withdrawal process, even if it is less expedient or costlier for the Union. 
This is in line with the advocated constitutionalist interpretation of Article 50, in 
that it makes express reference to respect for domestic constitutional rules. Other 
international treaties, conventions and agreements that contain withdrawal clauses do 
not make such reference.74  They are based on a classic international law paradigm, 
which treats States as unitary actors whose domestic constitutional arrangements are 
not a matter of international law. By contrast, the inclusion of a clause of respect for 
national constitutional identities in Article 4(2) TEU renders respect for national 
constitutional traditions part of the EU's own constitution.75 
Obviously, the precise nature of the requirement under Article 50(1), as well as its 
enforceability, are still open to debate. While the matter was intensely litigated in the 
UK, up to the highest level, it would appear that the UK has not yet determined 
precisely what its constitutional requirements are except in a very general manner. In 
particular, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller merely confirmed that, in light of the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, the Government cannot notify under Article 
50 without Parliament’s express authorization, which was the key question in the 
proceedings.76 Complying with this ruling, the Government put the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Bill before Parliament. While the House of Lords 
proposed amendments to the Bill regarding the protection of acquired rights for EU 
                                                
73 List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 60. 
74  Helfer, “Terminating treaties” in The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP, 2012), pp. 641-3: 
Approximately 60% of treaties surveyed contain an exit clause, but their terms vary significantly 
depending on their subject, e.g. bilateral investment treaties often contain a “continuation of effects” 
clause; arms treaties sometimes require a justification of withdrawal etc. 
75 See, on this point, Von Bogdandy and Schill, “Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national 
identity under the Lisbon Treaty”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 1417; Millet, “The respect for national 
constitutional identity in the European legal space: An approach to federalism as constitutionalism” in 
Azoulai (Ed.), The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP, 2014). 
76 Miller Supreme Court, para 101. 
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citizens in the UK and the reservation of a second vote in Parliament after an 
agreement had been negotiated, the House of Commons overrode these amendments, 
and the legislation received the royal assent on 16 March 2017. A parliamentary 
sovereignty traditionalist might therefore argue that there is no further need to 
determine what the constitutional requirements of the UK are; the (European Union) 
Notification of Withdrawal Act is constitutionally unchallengeable because the will of 
parliament cannot be the subject of judicial review.77 While we cannot examine UK 
constitutional law in detail in this paper, we have significant reservations on this point 
regarding aspects of parliamentary sovereignty that the courts in Miller did not 
examine. 
More specifically, in Miller, the Supreme Court simply found that “the change in 
the law”, which the implementation of the result of the referendum requires “must be 
made in the only way in which the UK constitution permits, namely through 
Parliamentary legislation”.78 It refrained from looking further into this question, 
stating that “what form such legislation should take is entirely a matter for 
Parliament”.79  But does this mean that Parliament can, through a single act, give 
carte blanche to the Government to negotiate the UK’s withdrawal? Or must 
Parliament be in a position to vote on the terms of the agreement itself, in a way 
which does not involve a mere rubber-stamping at a later stage in the process? 
A powerful legal opinion by Sir David Edward and others (hereafter “Edward et 
al. Opinion”) points to the contrary.80 The Edward et al. Opinion argues that the UK's 
constitutional requirements include the need for Parliament to approve the withdrawal 
agreement, because it is that agreement which will ultimately determine the fate of 
current rights under EU law.81 The mere parliamentary authorization of the Article 50 
notification is insufficient, because it does not determine any actual changes to UK 
law after withdrawal. On the basis of Miller, therefore, the authors argue that a valid 
constitutional decision to withdraw in accordance with the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty can ultimately be taken only at the conclusion of the Brexit 
negotiations.82 Under the UK constitution, that decision is conditional on ultimate 
parliamentary approval, and it is only at the end of the Article 50 negotiations, when 
the terms of withdrawal are clear, that there can be a final decision on such 
withdrawal. Even if there is no withdrawal agreement, it is but Parliament which can 
decide, at the end of the two-year process, that the UK leaves the EU. That means 
that, under UK constitutional law, withdrawal is a process requiring a series of steps. 
Under EU law, the question that the Edward et al. Opinion raises is whether their 
understanding of the UK's constitutional requirements can be reconciled with the 
terms of Article 50.  On a bare reading of this provision, the decision to withdraw 
(para 1) and its notification, which starts the two-year period (para 2), are sequential. 
However, a constitutionalist interpretation requires deep and genuine respect for the 
withdrawing Member State's constitutional requirements. In the UK context, those 
requirements mean that the ultimate withdrawal decision can only be taken once the 
terms of the withdrawal agreement and of the future relations between the 
withdrawing State and the EU are fully known. Under Article 50(1), the EU should 
respect this. Furthermore, this conception has merit, in particular because it is only in 
the face of sufficient knowledge of the terms of withdrawal that a fully considered 
                                                
77 See R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. 
78 Miller Supreme Court, para 121. 
79 Ibid., para 122. 
80 Edward, Jacobs, Lever, Mountfield and Facenna, “In the matter of Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union”, Opinion for Bindmans LLP, 10 Feb. 2017, 
<www.bindmans.com/uploads/files/documents/Final_Article_50_Opinion_10.2.17.pdf> (last visited 3 
Apr. 20170. 
81 Ibid., paras. 22-23. 
82 Ibid., paras. 26-28. 
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decision can be taken. The Brexit debate amply shows this in the sense that the 
sharpest critique of the referendum is that voters were unable to know what the terms 
of Brexit were going to be.83 Moreover, there is some support for such a reading in the 
text of Article 50, since paragraph 2 refers to notification only of the “intention” to 
withdraw - thus suggesting, as we shall further argue below, that the decision 
previously taken under Article 50(1) may be reversed. 
Accordingly, whereas this position may not hold true for constitutional orders in 
which parliamentary sovereignty is not a key constitutional requirement, or indeed 
where the decision to withdraw may reflect a settled position on a particular policy,84 
in the legal and political context of Brexit, the constitutionally sound approach is to 
look at withdrawal as a process, more than as a punctual decision. Indeed, as Gordon 
has noted, Brexit is driving profound changes in the constitutional requirements of the 
UK itself, as it is causing a sharp - and unusually rapid - codification of these 
requirements through litigation.85 In line with the voluntary nature of withdrawal 
under Article 50(1), Article 50 should therefore be read overall in a way that 
accommodates the UK’s uncodified, political constitution as a form of constitutional 
organization inherently susceptible to change through politics.86 
 
4.2. Revocability of the intention to withdraw 
 
Since the UK’s decision to withdraw is not necessarily to be considered a fixed one, 
taken prior to notification, a further key question for the overall constitutionality of 
the withdrawal process arises: to what extent is a duly notified intention to withdraw 
revocable – or, to use Lord Pannick’s now famous analogy in Miller, must the bullet, 
once fired, necessarily reach its target?87 The courts in Miller88 did not rule on this 
point, as the parties had accepted that the notification is irrevocable, and the outcome 
of the Miller litigation did not depend on it.89 In any event, UK courts would not have 
been in a position to decide this question: it relates clearly to the interpretation of 
Article 50, a provision of Union law and, as such, would have required a reference to 
the ECJ. The question of revocability therefore remains alive and of crucial legal 
importance. 
The wording of Article 50 does not offer much help when it comes to revocability. 
After stating that a Member State “may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements”, Article 50 stipulates that the 
Member State in question “shall notify the European Council of its intention”. Thus, 
Article 50 clearly distinguishes the decision to withdraw (para 1) from its notification 
(para 2). While, as Jean-Claude Piris has put it, “intentions” can change,90 textually 
Article 50(2) does not concern the notification of a mere political intention, but of an 
intention based on a decision to withdraw taken in accordance with a Member State’s 
                                                
83 Cf. Weale, “The democratic duty to oppose Brexit”, lecture delivered at UCL on 8 Dec. 2016, 
<www.ucl.ac.uk/political-science/news/articles/121216> (last visited 13 Mar. 2017). 
84 For instance, this was arguably the case in relation to Greenland, where the debate about membership 
specifically concerned the EU fisheries policy: see further Tatham, op. cit. supra note 2. 
85 Gordon, “Brexit: A challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?”, 12 EuConst (2016), 
411. 
86 Ibid., 436-437. 
87  Transcript of Miller Divisional Court hearing, 19, <www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/20161013-all-day.pdf> (last visited 1 Dec. 2016). 
88 The Supreme Court affirmed the Divisional Courts finding on this, at para 26. 
89 Eeckhout, “Miller and the Art 50 notification: Revocability is irrelevant”, London-Brussels One-Way 
or Return: A cross-channel Europe blog by Piet Eeckout, 14 Nov. 2016, 
<www.londonbrussels.wordpress.com/2016/11/14/miller-and-the-art-50-notification-revocability-is-
irrelevant/> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016). 
90 Piris, “Article 50 is not for ever and the UK could change its mind”, Financial Times, 1 Sept. 2016, 
<www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016). 
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constitutional requirements. In turn, an intention of this kind has a clear legal meaning 
and constitutional implications for the EU, as laid down in Article 50(3), namely the 
commencement of a two-year process for exit. In the run-up to Miller (and, as noted 
above, in Miller itself), the assumption was that notification would set in motion an 
irrevocable state of affairs - a two-year clock that could no longer be stopped by UK 
action alone.91 
In line with the discussion offered by the Edward et al. Opinion, though, the 
analysis of whether and when a notification of withdrawal can be revoked must be 
deepened. We fully agree with Paul Craig’s point that if a Member State bona fide 
changes its mind about leaving, it would be absurd for the EU - and indeed for other 
Member States - to force it to withdraw based on the assumed irrevocability of Article 
50.92  We also agree with Sarmiento that it would “make no sense” for other EU 
Member States not to accept such a change of heart, in light of the political and 
economic repercussions that a withdrawal would cause to the EU overall.93 Article 50 
can certainly be stopped if everyone believes that this would be in their common 
interest. Yet, the only question that bears constitutional and not just political relevance 
is whether there is a possibility for a State unilaterally to revoke its notification, even 
if other Member States and the Union institutions would prefer to go ahead with 
withdrawal. 
In our view, the distinction between the decision to withdraw and the notification 
of the intention to do so is again critical. A Member State is entitled to decide, in 
accordance with its constitutional requirements, to withdraw from the EU. If that 
Member State re-considered that decision, within the two-year timeframe, there would 
no longer be a domestic constitutional basis for withdrawal.94 The reference to 
constitutional requirements in Article 50(1) suggests that, in order to revoke the 
notification, the withdrawing State would simply need to show that the decision to 
withdraw is no longer compatible with its constitutional requirements in that a new 
decision has been taken.95 
As Phillipson has noted, to draw any clear-cut distinction between Article 50(1) 
and Article 50(2) would be deeply formalistic.96 It is not possible to ensure genuine 
respect for the constitutional requirements of the withdrawing State, particularly in the 
UK context, if these are not respected throughout the withdrawal process. Depending 
on what the constitutional requirements are, that could mean the rejection of the 
decision to withdraw by Parliament only, or by Parliament after a new referendum.97 
It must be emphasized, though, that in order for a new decision not to withdraw to 
reverse the withdrawal process, that decision would need to be about withdrawal 
altogether, and not just about the rejection of a specific agreement. 
There is of course a need to avoid abuse of Article 50. The structure of the 
provision tilts the scales in favour of the EU at the negotiation stage, at least to some 
extent. But it could not be otherwise. In light of the autonomous power to decide to 
withdraw in accordance with its own constitutional requirements that Article 50 
                                                
91 See, most notably, King, Hickman and Barber, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘trigger’: Parliament’s 
indispensable role”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 27 June 2016, 
<www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-
50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017). 
92 Craig, “Brexit: A drama in six acts”, 41 EL Rev. (2016), 464. 
93 Sarmiento, “Miller, Brexit and the (maybe not to so evil) Court of Justice”, Verfassungsblog, 8 Nov. 
2016, <www.verfassungsblog.de/miller-brexit-and-the-maybe-not-to-so-evil-court-of-justice/> (last 
visited 11 Dec. 2016). 
94 See Craig, op. cit. supra note 92 at 464. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Phillipson, “A dive into deep constitutional waters: Article 50, the prerogative and parliament”, 79 
MLR (2016), 1069. 
97 On the latter point see Gordon, op. cit. supra note 85 at 429. 
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affords the withdrawing State, it is logical that the provision then balances that 
discretion with stricter conditions upon notification. The scope for abuse is clear: a 
State wishing to withdraw could notify, engage in a two-year negotiation, withdraw 
that notification, and then re-notify and repeat the process. That would have the effect 
of holding the Union and other Member States hostage to an extended negotiation 
without engaging the unanimity requirement set out in Article 50(3). And it is 
precisely that possibility that, in light of the travaux, the drafters of the provision had 
sought to prevent. 
However, the possibility of abuse would be prevented by the requirement that 
withdrawal of the notification should be in good faith. At this stage, the extent to 
which the withdrawing State would be required to prove that it was acting based on a 
genuine change of heart is difficult to predict. In light of the fact that EU law has a 
distinct, but fairly limited doctrine of abuse of law,98 and has never encountered that 
question in similar circumstances, the matter could be litigated before the ECJ. Still, if 
a Member State could not withdraw its notification after changing its mind, that 
would amount to expulsion from the Union - a possibility that is considered and 
rejected in the travaux of the provision.99  It would also be contrary to the principles 
of good faith, loyal cooperation,100 and the Union’s commitment to respect the 
Member States’ constitutional identities101 - all of which are constitutional principles 
requiring respect by EU institutions. 
Yet, in the absence of abuse, it is difficult to detect constitutionally sound reasons 
for rejecting revocability. It is true that revocation would be intrusive, both at a 
political level for the EU and the other Member States, and at a personal and business 
level for persons and companies making arrangements for withdrawal. But so is a 
withdrawal which goes ahead. There can hardly be a legitimate expectation on 
something as fundamental as withdrawal from the EU. 
A last point concerns the comparison with international law. Even if we reject an 
internationalist reading of Article 50, that comparison is instructive. Article 68 VCLT 
accepts that a withdrawal notification can be revoked “at any time before it takes 
effect”. Earlier, we established that Article 50 differs from the Vienna Convention in 
that it confirms a unilateral right to withdrawal. The reason is a constitutionalist one: 
exit from the EU polity must always be possible. It follows that Article 50 cannot be 
construed as prohibiting revocability where international law does not: that would 
completely contradict the respect for a domestic constitutional decision which lies at 
the heart of the rationale and structure of this provision. 
Thus, overall, provided there is a new decision not to withdraw taken in good 
faith, the Article 50 clock can be stopped. After all, “the goal of the Union is 
integration, not disintegration”.102 
 
4.3. The withdrawal agreement 
 
4.3.1. Legal basis 
Article 50(2) TEU lays down the procedure to be followed for the negotiation of an 
agreement, between the EU and the withdrawing State, “setting out the arrangements 
                                                
98 See Saydé, “Defining the concept of abuse of Union law”, 33 YEL (2014), 138 and, more generally, 
Saydé, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal Market (Hart, 2014). The concept of abuse in 
EU law so far has mainly concerned issues such as the abuse of welfare protections (see e.g. Case C-
333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358) and questions of a regulatory “race to the bottom” due to convenient 
choice of law - a question that became particularly clear in Case C-438/05, ITWF  v. Viking Line, 
EU:C:2007:772. 
99 List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 5. 
100 Art. 4(3) TEU. 
101 Ibid., Art. 4(2). 
102 Duff, op. cit. supra note 24 at 9. 
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for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the 
Union”. A bare reading of the provision reveals some noteworthy points. The 
withdrawal agreement is subject to a qualified-majority vote in the Council and needs 
the consent of the European Parliament.  However, there is no individual role for the 
Member States, and the withdrawal agreement does not need their approval (it is not a 
“mixed” agreement). Further, the “arrangements for … withdrawal” are wholly 
undefined, except for the proviso that account should be taken of the framework for 
the future relationship. This is unspecific language open to a range of different 
interpretations. 
At the time of writing, the prevailing view in the EU appears to be that the 
withdrawal agreement can or will only deal with the actual terms of withdrawal, and 
that the future relationship will need to be negotiated post-Brexit when the UK will 
have become a third country.103 There is also speculation about a transitional period, 
the terms of which may or may not be part of the withdrawal agreement. As regards 
any future agreement, it is frequently pointed out that such an agreement is likely to 
be mixed, with all the attendant difficulties of securing approval by all Member States 
in accordance with their constitutional requirements.104 
However, a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 requires that these various 
assumptions be subjected to a deeper analysis. There is a whole body of law on EU 
competence, internal and external; on the reasons for mixed agreements; and on the 
appropriate legal basis for the conclusion of an international agreement.105 As no 
decisions have been taken yet on how withdrawal and future relations will be 
structured, it is too early to offer any in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, the existing 
body of law allows for some initial comments on the proposed course of action. 
A first question is the extent to which the withdrawal agreement could regulate the 
future relationship between the UK and the EU. The wording of Article 50(2) 
instructs the negotiators to take account of the framework for the future relationship.  
These are enigmatic terms, in that they neither spell out what is meant by this 
“framework” nor whether that framework needs to be part of a separate agreement. 
Textually, all that can be said is that the withdrawal agreement should include 
references to the future relationship. However, it is less obvious to read Article 50 as 
conferring competence on the EU to regulate, in the withdrawal agreement, both the 
terms of withdrawal and the full organization of the future relationship. That would 
appear to involve substantially more than “setting out the arrangements for … 
withdrawal”. 
It must nonetheless be noted that agreements concluded by the EU may have more 
than one provision in the EU Treaties as their legal basis. In terms of EU legal 
principle, we do not see any significant barriers to a withdrawal agreement which also 
regulates the future relationship on a legal basis different from Article 50 TEU. If that 
future relationship were confined to trade matters, Article 207 TFEU would constitute 
the relevant provision. If, however, the future relationship includes a range of EU 
policy areas in which the UK may wish to continue to cooperate with the EU, as could 
perhaps be expected despite all the talk about a “hard Brexit”, an association pursuant 
to Article 217 TFEU ought to be considered. The latter provision is as vague as 
Article 50, in that an association is barely defined: it involves “reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedure”. The ECJ has determined that an 
association agreement empowers the EU to guarantee commitments towards non-
                                                
103 Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71, para 4.  For a useful summary of this view, see Flavier and 
Platon, “Brexit: A tale of two agreements?”, European Law Blog, 30 Aug. 2016, 
<www.europeanlawblog.eu/?p=3324> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016). 
104 See e.g. Maresceau, “A typology of mixed bilateral agreements” in Hillion and Koutrakos (Eds.), 
Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Hart, 2010), p. 17. 
105 See e.g. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), chapters 2-5. 
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Member States in all the fields covered by the Treaties.106  The competence to 
conclude association agreements is, in substantive terms, the broadest external 
competence for which the EU Treaties provide. The judgment in Demirel is telling in 
this respect. It accepted that the association agreement with Turkey could provide for 
some measure of free movement of workers, even if at the time no express 
competences in the field of immigration from third countries had been conferred upon 
the EEC. An association agreement with the UK could, likewise, guarantee 
commitments in all the fields covered by the Treaties.107 
An often heard argument against the combination of Article 50 (the withdrawal 
agreement) with an association or trade agreement regulating the future relationship 
consists of pointing out that the latter type of agreement can only be negotiated and 
concluded with a "third country" (see also Art. 218 TFEU).108 The UK, by contrast, 
remains a Member State in the course of the withdrawal process, and the withdrawal 
agreement could therefore be seen as a sui generis agreement: with a Member State, 
but regulating its exit from the EU. Article 50, as the legal basis for such a sui generis 
agreement, could then not be combined with a legal basis regulating the future 
relationship with the UK as a third country. 
However, such a distinction does not survive closer scrutiny. Article 50(3) 
conceives of the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement as coinciding with 
actual Brexit, i.e. with the UK being released from its Treaty obligations, losing its 
Member State status, and becoming a third country. The agreement therefore 
regulates the future relationship just as much as any other agreement would. Just think 
of one of the core features of the agreement in current political discourse: the 
protection of the rights of EU citizens in the UK, and UK citizens in the EU (the 
"acquired rights" issue). This protection will be part of the future relationship with the 
UK, just as much as any (hypothetical) decision to maintain tariff-free trade. Of 
course the withdrawal agreement will be negotiated when the UK continues to be a 
Member State, but what matters in legal terms (including questions of competence) is 
the nature of the international commitments undertaken at the point of conclusion and 
entry into force. The withdrawal agreement is, of necessity, predicated on the UK 
becoming a third country, and in that respect indistinguishable from a trade or 
association agreement with the UK based on Article 207 or 217 TFEU respectively, 
and negotiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 218 TFEU. 
A further point to note is that, even if most association agreements are mixed 
agreements, it is doubtful whether the determination of the future relationship requires 
mixity. The justification for mixed agreements reflects the cardinal EU constitutional 
principle of limited and conferred powers. As clearly stated in Article 5(2) TEU, 
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
States”. Withdrawal, however, is a special case. In all matters covered by the Treaties, 
the EU Member States have conferred the power to regulate their relationship with the 
UK on the EU, simply by virtue of the UK's current membership.  Take immigration 
as an example. The EU's competences to regulate immigration of third-country 
nationals are clearly defined, leaving most of the substance of immigration policies to 
national competence.109 However, as far as UK citizens are concerned, there is at 
present no such national competence, because UK citizens are EU citizens benefitting 
from free movement. 
                                                
106 Case C-12/86, Demirel, EU:C:1987:400, para 9 (at the time the Court of course referred to the EEC 
and to the EEC Treaty, but it can be assumed that today an association may cover policies in both the 
TEU and the TFEU). 
107 See also Case C-81/13, UK v. Council EU:C:2014:2449. 
108 See the Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71 at 4, para 4. 
109 Art. 79 TFEU. 
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The UK remains a Member State throughout the withdrawal process. If a full 
agreement on the future relationship were to be reached in the course of that process, 
it is difficult to see any strict legal reasons for mixity. The EU's implied powers 
doctrine may be relevant here.110 Such powers normally flow from EU legislation, but 
in the pending proceedings on the EU-Singapore agreement the Commission 
advocates an extension to matters regulated in the Treaties themselves. 111  The 
argument is that the regulation of portfolio investment, whilst not within the scope of 
the concept of foreign direct investment in Article 207(1) TFEU, is within the EU's 
exclusive competence because such investment is covered by the TFEU provisions on 
free movement of capital. It remains to be seen whether this argument will be 
accepted, but at least it shows that the extension of an implied-powers type reasoning 
to the Treaties is not unimaginable.112 Furthermore, there is of course also plenty of 
EU legislation - nearly the whole of the acquis communautaire - which risks being 
"affected" or whose scope will be altered by Brexit. This would normally trigger 
exclusive EU competence. It is true that the potential effect on the acquis is not a 
substantive one, but is more of a territorial kind. In that sense one cannot say that the 
existing case law on exclusive implied powers offers a clear precedent. Nevertheless, 
there is an obvious analogy, in that EU law has “occupied the field” of regulating the 
relationship between the UK and other EU Member States across the acquis. 
 
4.3.2. Protection of acquired rights 
As there is a basis in the Treaties for a Member State to exit the Union and the 
maintenance of existing rights has not been made a precondition for exit, it might be 
assumed that, in principle, withdrawal can entail the loss of any rights associated with 
membership. Indeed, Article 50 does not specifically provide for guarantees of the 
status of EU citizens in the withdrawing State and vice versa. Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, at the Constitutional Convention a number of delegates had proposed 
amendments that safeguarded existing rights, which were not adopted.113 However, 
there is a strong constitutional case for making the maintenance of acquired rights an 
essential element of an agreement.114 A meaningful constitutional interpretation of 
Article 50 indeed requires in-depth consideration of respect for individual rights as 
one of the most settled features of the EU constitutional order to date.115 That is 
especially the case insofar as agreement on the status of acquired rights was not 
reached during the travaux.116 
Space does not permit exhaustive exploration of the vast array of issues that arise 
on the topic of acquired rights. We will therefore merely offer some limited 
                                                
110 See, for the latest account of implied powers, Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114. 
111 Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, FTA with Singapore, EU:C:2016:992. 
112 See also Case C-431/11, UK v. Council EU:C:2013:589; and Case C-656/11, UK v. Council 
EU:C:2014:97 (confirming Art. 48 TFEU as the legal basis for new provisions on social security in the 
context of, respectively, the EEA and the EU-Switzerland agreement on free movement of persons). 
113 E.g. see Danish amendment, List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 20. 
114 See also the Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71. 
115 Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat. 
116 We note that existing rights under EU law do not pertain merely to the doctrine of acquired rights 
under international law and, particularly Art. 70(1)b of the VCLT, which has a narrower reach. The 
latter doctrine would likely have a limited impact on the conduct of the negotiations: see Lalive, “The 
doctrine of acquired rights” in Rights and Duties of Private Investors Abroad (Matthew Bender, 1965), 
pp. 145 et seq.; Douglas-Scott, “What happens to ‘acquired rights’ in the event of a Brexit?”, UK 
Constitutional Law Blog, 16 May 2016, <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/05/16/sionaidh-douglas-
scott-what-happens-to-acquired-rights-in-the-event-of-a-brexit/> (last visited 19 Dec. 2016); Piris, 
“Should the UK withdraw from the EU: Legal aspects and possible options”, Foundation Robert 
Schuman Policy Paper No. 355 (2015), 10, <www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-
355-en.pdf> (last visited 19 Dec. 2016). Instead, our concern is with the fate of the obligations that 
arise from EU law itself. 
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observations on the constitutional obligations of the UK and the EU, regarding: the 
protection of the rights to private and family life of UK nationals in the EU and EU 
citizens in the UK in the withdrawal agreement (4.3.2.1.); the protection against 
uncertainty during the negotiations for UK nationals in the EU and EU citizens in the 
UK (4.3.2.2.); the protection of other acquired rights in the withdrawal agreement, for 
those who have exercised them before the UK’s withdrawal (4.3.2.3.); and, finally, 
the maintenance of rights associated with EU citizenship for UK nationals (4.3.2.4.). 
We cannot fully address a series of sub-issues that may be further explored and which 
we can only list here in outline, such as the precise degree to which human rights will 
remain protected in the UK after withdrawal under UK law; and the rights of EU 
citizens moving to the UK and UK nationals moving to the EU at different stages of 
the withdrawal process. We must also highlight that, in our discussion, we refer 
jointly to Strasbourg case law and the case law of the ECJ, premised on the settled 
position of full respect for the European Convention of Human Rights in EU law and 
without delving further into debates about the autonomy of EU law that may be raised 
in this context.117 
 
4.3.2.1. Protection of the rights to private and family life in the withdrawal agreement 
Regression in the level of protection of human rights is a key issue in the withdrawal 
process and must be addressed in the agreement itself. Insofar as the UK is concerned, 
it must be pointed out that the ECHR protects the right to reside and the right to 
family life of those who have made meaningful ties in the host Member State118 and 
construes these concepts broadly.119 It is clear that Article 8 ECHR will be engaged 
should the UK wish to expel EU citizens who will be largely covered by existing 
ECtHR case law.120 At a minimum, the ECHR level of protection of the rights to 
private and family life must be maintained in the agreement. Any agreement that does 
not meet this level will be constitutionally challengeable in both the UK and the EU. 
Indeed, it is clear that precisely the same considerations apply to UK nationals 
currently residing in other EU Member States. All of the Member States remain 
signatories of the Convention and respect for the ECHR has underpinned the ECJ’s 
case law from its early years.121 It is therefore incontrovertible that, from the EU 
perspective, any negotiation or agreement that does not guarantee existing ECHR 
rights will be inherently problematic. 
In fact, the main interpretative issues in this field do not concern this minimum. 
Rather, they pertain to the extent to which the rights to private and family life must be 
guaranteed in the sense in which they are understood in the EU at present. It is clear 
                                                
117 For a discussion of this point see further Eeckhout, “Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR 
and judicial dialogue: Autonomy or autarky?”, 38 Fordham International Law Review (2015), 955; 
Eeckhout, “Human rights and the autonomy of EU law: Pluralism or integration?”, 66 Current Legal 
Problems (2013), 169. 
118 Ibid. See ECtHR, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 50963/99, judgment of 20 June 2002, para 114; 
ECtHR, Samsonnikov v. Estonia, Appl. No. 52178/10, judgment of 3 July 2012; ECtHR, Slivenko v. 
Latvia, Appl. No. 48321/99, judgment of 9 Oct. 2003; ECtHR, Anam v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 
21783/08, judgment of 7 June 2011; ECtHR, AA v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8000/08, judgment of 
20 Sept. 2011. 
119 ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, Appl. No. 13710/88, judgment of 16 Dec. 1992, para 29; ECtHR, 
Onur v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27319/07, judgment of 17 Feb. 2008, para 46; ECtHR, 
Samsonnikov v. Estonia, para 81. 
120 Human Rights Committee, “The human rights implications of Brexit: Written evidence from Dr 
Kirsty Hughes”, HRB0009, 
<www.data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-rights-
committee/what-are-the-human-rights-implications-of-brexit/written/38477.html#_ftn12> (last visited 
11 Dec. 2016), paras. 5-25. 
121 See Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, EU:C:1970:114, para 4; see also Case C-
4/73, Nold v. Commission, EU:C:1974:51, para 13; Case C-44/79, Hauter v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 
EU:C:1979:290, paras. 15-17.   
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that, for EU institutions and remaining Member States, the relevant interpretation of 
these rights will be not just that of the ECHR, but that of the Treaties and the Charter - 
that is the basis on which they will be held to account in the first instance.122 Pursuant 
to Article 52 EUCFR, the level of protection offered by the Charter must meet the 
ECHR standard, but it can also go beyond it. EU law is indeed more extensive than 
the ECHR in its protection of the rights of citizens so that the process of the 
negotiations and any potential agreement are likely to require a heightened degree of 
constitutional scrutiny on the EU side. 
More specifically, the right to private and family life requires observance within 
EU law under Article 7 of the Charter as well as Article 19(1) thereof, which protects 
against collective expulsions. Furthermore, when considered together, Article 7 
EUCFR and Articles 20-21 TFEU in conjunction with secondary legislation,123 create 
stronger rights to family reunification for EU citizens and their family members to 
enter the UK than the ECHR has so far accommodated.124  In particular, EU law has 
offered EU citizens the opportunity to reunite with their core family as well as other 
dependent family members both from within the EU and from third countries, 
provided they meet certain conditions, and has offered them the right of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality upon valid entry.125 This is what the debate 
about the maintenance of private and family life should therefore focus on. 
EU institutions and existing Member States will not be in a position to negotiate 
any reduction in the level of protection of private and family life for UK nationals 
living in the EU. While UK nationals will not necessarily continue to benefit from the 
Citizens’ Directive if they are no longer EU citizens, they will nonetheless continue to 
benefit from the right to private and family life protected in Article 7 EUCFR and the 
Court’s existing case law,126 and not merely the case law of the ECtHR. Furthermore, 
UK nationals currently living in other Member States would have once been EU 
citizens, who have built their lives by relying on the Union’s most basic freedom to 
move to and reside in another Member State. It would be deeply problematic if the 
impact on their lives of a sudden change of status were excluded from the assessment 
of the meaning of Article 7 EUCFR in the EU context. Even if it were not a breach of 
international human rights law for the EU not to recognize that the private and family 
life of UK nationals residing in the EU comprises rights to non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality and family reunification (and, as we will go on to explain, in 
our assessment it would also amount to a breach of Art. 8 ECHR), it would still go 
against the Union’s stated respect for values such as the dignity of the person and the 
rule of law, as listed in Article 2 TEU and further expressed in the Charter’s Preamble 
and Article 1 thereof. 
But it should also not be assumed that the ECHR standard of protection of the 
rights to private and family life will remain static or that it will not take into account 
the fact that the relationship between the UK and the EU so far has comprised family 
reunification and full protection against discrimination in seeking and finding work, 
and engaging in other activities that make private and family life meaningful, or 
                                                
122 Case C-501/10, Kamberaj, EU:C:2012:233, paras. 62-63 and 80. 
123 Directive 2004/38/EC, cited supra note 35, Arts. 2-3. 
124 Hughes, cited supra note 120, paras. 27-31. See ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. 
United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985; ECtHR, Gül v. 
Switzerland, Appl. No. 23218/94, judgment of 19 Feb.1996; ECtHR, Ahmut v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 
21702/93, judgment of 28 Nov. 1996; ECtHR, Sen v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 31465/96, judgment of 21 
Dec. 2001; ECtHR, Senchishak v. Finland, Appl. No. 5049/12, judgment of 18 Nov. 2014; ECtHR, AS 
v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 39350/13, judgment of 30 June 2015. 
125 Directive 2004/38/EC, cited supra note 35, Arts. 2, 3 and 7. 
126 See, by analogy Case C-413/99, Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493; Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, 
EU:C:2004:639; Case C-127/08, Metock and Others, EU:C:2008:449; Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, 
EU:C:2011:124. 
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indeed, possible. As the ECtHR put the matter in Chapman, “if the home was lawfully 
established, this factor would self-evidently be something which would weigh against 
the legitimacy of requiring the individual to move”.127 This suggests, firstly, that the 
principle of non-regression of rights lawfully acquired will be significant for the 
ECtHR in its assessment of Article 8 ECHR, should it be raised in this connection. 
Secondly, in our view, a broad construction of that principle is likely to be employed. 
The Convention is a “living instrument” that develops in line with the context and 
needs of the time and place at which it is applied128 and the ECtHR has over time 
become more receptive to broader conceptions of private life, and now considers 
work a central aspect thereof.129 It has also referred to the Charter and EU case law to 
support decisions that heighten the standard in its interpretation of ECHR articles, 
including Article 8. 130  In our view, therefore, it would be very unlikely that 
expulsions, but indeed any reduction in the existing level of protection of the right to 
private and family life of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU, would be 
allowed under the ECHR. Both the EU and the UK are under a constitutional 
obligation to ensure the maintenance of a high level of respect for the rights to private 
and family life, and to construe these rights broadly, after withdrawal. 
But to what extent is that state of affairs to be determined in a withdrawal 
agreement? Our analysis implies that, absent any agreement, both the UK and the EU 
would be under separate obligations to respect the rights to private and family life to a 
comparable degree under, on the one hand the ECHR, and on the other hand the 
ECHR, EUCFR, and general principles of EU law. This observation nonetheless also 
highlights the constitutional duties of the Union in concluding a withdrawal 
agreement with the withdrawing State. The EU is under a clear obligation to conclude 
an agreement with the UK that protects fundamental rights. Two of the Union’s 
objectives are to “uphold and promote” its values in its external relations131 and to 
ensure the “well-being of its peoples”.132 Furthermore, Article 3(5) TEU provides that 
human rights must be ensured in the Union’s relations with third countries. 
Guaranteeing the protection of the rights to private and family life is, therefore, 
crucial to the constitutionality of the agreement. Put simply, any agreement the EU 
negotiates must be based on continued respect by the UK for the rights to private and 
family life of EU citizens and, of course, an unconditional guarantee, in turn, of these 
rights for UK nationals. The introduction of any clauses seeking to limit these rights 
would not be concomitant with the Union’s commitment to human rights. It is 
therefore in the interests of the parties to conclude an agreement that makes specific 
provision for - and is premised upon respect of - these rights as they are understood 
today under a commonly acceptable external standard (the ECHR). 
 
4.3.2.2. Protection against uncertainty during the negotiations and the use of human 
beings as “bargaining chips” 
The argument concerning the rights to private and family life can be taken further. As 
Mantouvalou has noted, the current position of EU citizens in the UK (and, likewise, 
of UK nationals in the EU) raises questions of compatibility with the ECHR.133 The 
                                                
127 ECtHR, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27238/95, judgment of 18 Jan. 2001, para 102. 
128 ECtHR, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5856/72, judgment of 25 Apr. 1978, para 31. 
129 ECtHR, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, Appl. No. 55480/00, judgment of 27 July 2004; see 
further Mantouvalou, “Work and private life: Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania” 30 EL Rev. (2005), 
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130 ECtHR, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 28957/95, 27 Mar. 1996, para 100. See also, 
for a more detailed analysis, Dickson, “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the 
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131 Art. 3(5) TEU. 
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uncertainty and instability that these two groups face in the aftermath of the Brexit 
vote and the use of human beings as “bargaining chips” in the negotiations, which 
follows from the lack of specific guarantees about their status on both sides, is 
prejudicial to the rights to private and family life and can amount to a breach of 
Article 8 ECHR in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.134 These rights also have a life 
in EU constitutional law under Articles 7 and 21 of the Charter. Indeed, the case for 
protecting against the perseverance of uncertainty for both EU citizens in the UK and 
UK nationals in other EU Member States is even stronger under the Charter: Articles 
1 and 3 thereof protect the right to human dignity and the integrity of the person, 
respectively. In a situation falling within the scope of EU law, which Brexit inevitably 
is, those rights require respect by all existing Member States (including the UK) and 
by the EU institutions.135
In its report on safeguarding acquired rights during Brexit, the House of Lords 
urged the Government to proceed with a unilateral guarantee of the rights of EU 
citizens in the UK.136 Similar statements have been occasionally made by EU 
officials.137 However, so far, neither side has adopted an official position on the 
matter, thus causing the two affected groups substantial uncertainty for almost a year 
following the referendum, as well as the possibility of at least two years of further 
uncertainty. On the one hand, the UK has not, in its letter of notification of 
withdrawal, made any unilateral guarantees regarding the status of EU citizens other 
than merely making known an intention to “strike early agreement” about these rights. 
On the other hand, in its response to the UK’s notification, the European Council as 
well as its President, in his separate remarks, stated that the EU would strive to 
“minimize the uncertainty” created by the UK’s notification for EU citizens, but also 
did not provide any formal guarantees of the status of UK nationals currently residing 
in the EU.138 While the Council’s Draft Guidelines on negotiating Brexit are to be 
welcomed insofar as they clarify that “enforceable guarantees” on the status of 
citizens who have moved will be a priority for the negotiations, they are clearly 
premised on the idea that these guarantees must be “reciprocal”.139 Political discourse 
on both sides is therefore still keeping the status of the two affected migrant groups on 
the negotiating table.
Not only does the position of both parties on the subject of EU citizens in the UK 
and UK nationals in the EU place these groups in a position of uncertainty. The 
assessment of the human rights implications of the negotiations and agreement cannot 
be made in a vacuum. It is clear that, in the UK context in particular, the withdrawal 
cannot be disassociated from rhetoric that, as Paul Craig has put it, “bordered on the 
134 Ibid.; Lock and Patel, “Brexit: Constitutional and legal requirements”, UCL Public Policy Research 
Insights, July 2016, <www.ucl.ac.uk/public-policy/for-policy-professionals/research-insights/brexit-
constitutional-and-legal-requirements.pdf> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016).  See also House of Lord 
European Union Committee, Brexit: Acquired rights, 10th Report of Session 2016-17, HL Paper 82, 
paras. 88-92, <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/82/82.pdf> (last visited 
15 Dec. 2016). 
135 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 19. 
136 House of Lord European Union Committee, Brexit: Acquired rights, cited supra note 134, paras. 
147-148. 
137 See e.g. Ross and Rankin, “European Parliament Brexit chief: 'Let Britons keep freedom of 
movement’”, The Guardian, 10 Mar. 2017, <www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/10/let-britons-
keep-freedom-of-movement-says-eus-brexit-negotiator> (last visited 11 Mar. 2017). 
138 European Council Press Releases and Statements, “Statement by the European Council (Art. 50) on 
the UK notification”, cited supra note 1; European Council Press Releases and Statements, “Remarks 
by President Donald Tusk following the UK notification”, No. 160/17, 29 Mar. 2017, 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-tusk-remarks-uk-notification/> (last 
visited 29 Mar. 2017). 
139 Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71 at 5, para 8. 
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xenophobic, and in some instances crossed that line”.140 Furthermore, in the aftermath 
of the “Leave” vote, there are increasing reports about the use of this uncertainty of 
status to intimidate, limit access to facilities that EU citizens in the UK previously 
enjoyed, and/or collect additional personal data through resources lawfully enjoyed to 
date, such as schooling or healthcare.141 While no reports of the same nature in respect 
of UK nationals in the EU have come to our attention, as a matter of principle, the 
argument applies to them just as much.
It is in line with settled case law of both the ECtHR and the ECJ that the failure to 
take adequate measures to protect the rights derived, respectively, from the ECHR and 
from EU law, can itself amount to a breach thereof.142 The failure to take measures to 
guarantee that status can in itself amount to a breach of both ECHR and EU law and 
can form the subject of litigation before national courts, the ECtHR, and the ECJ, as it 
creates significant distress and deeply destabilizzes private lives lawfully established 
in the host State.143 That claim becomes increasingly stronger, the longer the period of 
uncertainty is maintained as we embark on the formal negotiations.
It follows that, based on a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 TEU, the 
guarantee of the rights to private and family life as assessed in section 4.3.2.1. above 
must not only be the object of any eventual agreement, but the very starting point of 
any negotiations so as to preclude the dehumanization ensuing from the use of rights 
as bargaining chips. 
4.3.2.3. Regression in the level of protection of other acquired rights 
In addition to the rights to private and family life, the withdrawal of a Member State 
from the EU creates significant scope for regression in terms of fundamental rights 
not protected independently in the Convention, and of a panoply of other rights of 
persons and companies. While the Great Repeal Bill may not immediately repeal UK 
legislation implementing EU directives and framework decisions,144 these rights will 
be removed from their parent legislation and the jurisdiction of the ECJ, resulting in 
reduced possibilities of judicial review; they will lose the primacy of EU law over 
inconsistent UK legislation; and there is no safeguard against future repeal. While 
there is scope for discussing these issues in detail in the context of the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU, this is largely subject to political 
negotiations. Of course, the EU cannot compel the UK to apply EU law after 
withdrawal. But that does not mean that the suspension of EU rights exercised before 
Brexit would be constitutionally unproblematic, either for the EU or for the UK. 
140 Craig, op. cit. supra note 92 at 455. 
141 In the UK, these concerns are severe: the UK Government itself has sought to collect data relating to 
EU status in the latest school census (Department for Education, “National statistics: Schools, pupils 
and their characteristics”, Jan. 2016, <www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-
characteristics-january-2016>), for which it has been deeply criticized; Adams and Belam, “Why 
parents are refusing to reveal their child’s nationality’, The Guardian, 8 Oct. 2016, 
<www.theguardian.com/education/2016/oct/08/boycottschoolcensus-why-parents-are-refusing-to-
reveal-their-childs-nationality> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017). Access to healthcare has been another key 
issue in the UK, raising a series of questions about entitlement to reside and the government’s failure to 
communicate the relevant rules clearly: Herbeć, “The scandal of CSI, the little-known loophole used to 
deny EU citizens permanent residency”, LSE Brexit Blog, 17 Mar. 2017, 
<www.blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/03/17/disheartened-and-disappointed-the-government-and-
universities-have-failed-eu-citizens-over-comprehensive-sickness-insurance/> (last visited 29 Mar. 
2017). 
142 Respectively: ECtHR, Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, Appl. No. 10126/82, judgment
of 21 June 1988, para 34; Case C-265/95, Commission v. France (Spanish Strawberries), 
EU:C:1997:346; see also Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, EU:C:2002:437. 
143 See ECtHR, Chapman v. UK, Appl. No. 27238/95, para 102.   
144 See Łazowski, op. cit. supra note 40. See also Łazowski, “Unilateral withdrawal from the EU: 
Realistic scenario or a folly?” (2016) Journal of European Public Policy, 5-7. 
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Regression in the level of protection of any acquired rights (e.g. the free 
movement of persons or even the free movement of goods) can be constitutionally 
destabilizing to the extent that it is prejudicial to the principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations - essential elements of a well-functioning constitutional 
polity.145 These principles form part of the constitutional orders of both the EU and 
the UK.146 
The argument is strongest as regards the rights of UK nationals in the EU that 
amount to EU fundamental rights applicable to residents,147 as enshrined in the 
Charter and the general principles of EU law, regardless of whether they are 
ultimately also comprised in the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR 
or not. Firstly, in light of the EU’s continuing constitutional commitment to these 
sources of rights protection, UK nationals in the EU are in a greatly advantageous 
position, in the sense that, even if the negotiations for an agreement failed, the EU 
would still be under an internal obligation to protect the fundamental rights of all 
those residing in its territory. In turn, this makes the case for trying to reach 
agreement on the same basis for EU citizens in the UK even clearer from a pragmatic 
point of view: since these rights will remain in place across the Union, UK nationals 
residing therein will continue to enjoy them in full. EU institutions must therefore 
strive to reach an agreement in which acquired rights derived from EU law continue 
to be protected in the UK in respect of EU citizens and other EU legal persons in the 
UK, in the form and level that they were understood at the time of withdrawal.148 The 
claim here may not be binding as to result, as it is clear that, by virtue of the existence 
of Article 50 TEU, there is no legitimate expectation of a Member State always 
remaining in the Union. There is, however, a legitimate expectation on the part of EU 
citizens that EU institutions will seek to protect them in case of a withdrawal, by 
making provision for the continued application of EU law for as long as EU citizens 
are present in the UK (and vice versa), including the ability to build up permanent 
residence entitlement, to work, and not to be discriminated against in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter and secondary legislation. 
Furthermore, safeguards such as the promulgation of the results of the negotiations 
and adequate notice periods to those benefitting from EU freedoms, who may be 
affected by changes to their status, may also be required under UK law, at least 
insofar as the rights of natural persons are required. The choice of moving to the UK 
has been embedded in a system of rights protection that allowed for the same rights in 
key aspects of life in the host State and provided for complete protection from 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. And as Lord Kerr has put it, particularly 
when the government has previously committed to a certain level of protection of 
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human rights, “it should be held to account in the courts as to its actual compliance 
with that standard”.149 
 
4.3.2.4. The loss of EU citizenship for UK nationals 
Our last point on the question of acquired rights relates to the status of UK citizens 
post-Brexit and the loss of their EU citizenship. Not only EU citizens in the UK and 
UK citizens in the EU, but indeed all UK citizens have so far been entitled to claim 
“civis europaeus sum”150 and the rights that come with that status. It is settled EU law 
that citizenship of the Union is destined to become the “fundamental status” of 
nationals of the Member States.151 On the one hand, since the Treaties provide for 
voluntary withdrawal from the Union, it is impossible to argue that the status of 
citizenship must be retained for UK citizens. On the other hand, though, it is 
important to refer back to the discussion of Article 50(1) in the travaux and to 
highlight the crucial nature of respect for constitutional requirements in doing so. To 
remove citizenship is not something that should be done lightly. As Hannah Arendt 
had argued, the loss of the ability to belong and to claim rights within a political 
community amounts to the loss of the very “right to have rights”.152 Can all UK 
citizens be stripped of their EU citizenship at once, even if they have not voluntarily 
renounced it? This is not merely a question of UK law or of inter-State politics, but 
connects with case law of the ECJ that requires a degree of respect for EU 
citizenship.153 That case law provides that “by reason of its nature and consequences” 
the loss of EU citizenship is subject to EU law principles.154 
It is noteworthy in this regard that, while the Commission has rejected a petition 
entitled “Stop Brexit”, since it would contravene the possibility of withdrawal under 
Article 50 TEU, it has registered two European Citizens’ Initiatives regarding the 
maintenance of citizenship rights after Brexit. It remains to be seen how these will be 
dealt with, but the Commission has highlighted that while it “cannot propose 
secondary legislation aiming at granting EU citizenship to natural persons who do not 
hold the nationality of a Member State of the Union, the rights of EU citizens in the 
UK and the rights of UK citizens in the EU after the withdrawal of the UK will be at 
the core of the upcoming Article 50 negotiations”.155 Furthermore, these initiatives 
highlight the precarious nature of any assumptions being made about EU citizenship 
having been voluntary renounced by UK nationals, on the basis of the referendum 
result alone. That is also supported, as Paul Craig notes, by the demographics of the 
referendum itself and the clear preference of younger voters for remaining in the 
EU.156 
It follows that, despite being a necessary consequence of withdrawal from the EU, 
which is envisaged in the Treaties and hence cannot be reviewed, the legality of the 
loss of EU citizenship does trigger EU constitutional guarantees. If EU citizenship 
has, as Advocate General Sharpston put it in Zambrano, come to mean more than just 
cross-border movement but a “uniform set of rights and obligations in a Union under 
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the rule of law”,157 then its removal must also be made in accordance therewith. It 
necessitates, in particular, compliance with common EU and UK values and general 
principles, including proportionality and principles of democratic governance, such as 
consistent consultation with civil society. As the Supreme Court confirmed (and the 
parties had already agreed) in Miller, the UK referendum on withdrawal was 
consultative in nature.158 The vote of a subset of the UK public to leave the EU, and 
therefore to alienate itself from EU citizenship, is not sufficient to undo the 
requirement of parliamentary approval. Under UK law, only Parliament - not 
government or the people voting by referendum - can remove rights that individuals 
currently hold.159 In turn, meaningful respect for EU citizenship further highlights the 
need for the UK Parliament - the only body constitutionally empowered with 
divesting UK nationals of their EU rights - to be able to vote on the agreement once 
the reduction in the level of protection of the rights of UK citizens has become 
known, rather than assuming that it has done so in advance by authorizing the 
government to notify.160 
If the Parliament does not have a final say on the matter, then under Article 50(1) 
and the aforementioned case law, the removal of EU citizenship that may follow from 
withdrawal will be reviewable by the ECJ, should it be asked to assess the terms and 
process of the agreement in an Opinion. 
 
4.3.3. Approval of the withdrawal agreement 
The final question that a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 must address is what 
happens once an agreement is reached. What is the role of parliaments in approving 
that agreement (both at the national and at the EU level)? At first glance, Article 50(3) 
offers easy enough answers to the questions of when withdrawal shall occur if an 
agreement is reached, signed, and ratified, as well as if no agreement is reached at all: 
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification 
referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the 
Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.” But does that 
mean that, if the UK Parliament comes back with amendments, all of this needs to 
take place within the two-year time-frame? And what if the European Parliament 
refuses its consent, and asks for re-negotiation? 
When assessed from a constitutionalist viewpoint, and considered in light of the 
discussions and concerns voiced during its drafting, it is clear that Article 50 was 
intended to privilege the reaching of an agreement. The ticking clock in the provision 
is preceded by a “failing that” which suggests that it is a fall-back option. The 
introduction of a timeframe was intended to act as a safeguard for both sides: it 
ensures that the withdrawing State does not stall the negotiations to gain time and, 
secondly, that the withdrawing State can still, if it so wishes, leave the Union even if 
no agreement is reached. However, neither of these concerns bite once an agreement 
has been negotiated and is put before the national and EU parliaments and the 
provision itself does not clearly stipulate what should happen in case the agreement 
duly negotiated within the two-year timeframe is not consented to. In our view, in 
such a case, the priority must be the reaching of a solid agreement that addresses key 
constitutional issues and enjoys the requisite support from the institutions involved in 
the process, and not a mere falling back on the “no-deal” approach. 
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This reading of Article 50 does not conflict with its terms. Indeed, “failing that” 
can be read as referring to the complete failure to negotiate (and thus conclude) a 
withdrawal agreement in the first place. Where there is an agreement, and either the 
national or EU parliament demands further negotiation, the two-year period ought to 
be regarded as suspended until the agreement is concluded and enters into force. It is 
only in case of a complete breakdown in the negotiations that exit without a 
withdrawal agreement ensues. As noted above, the reason the two-year timeframe was 
inserted into Article 50 was to clarify that the withdrawing State is under no 
obligation of further association with the Union, as well as to ensure that neither party 
is able to stall the negotiations. But it cannot be read as entailing the brushing aside of 
any effective parliamentary scrutiny once an agreement is found, or be used as a 
means of compelling the legislature to accept whatever agreement is put on the table. 
To read Article 50 in a way that requires the UK Parliament and the European 
Parliament to approve it within the two-year period would have this effect. Neither of 
these parliamentary bodies would have an interest in rejecting the agreement outright 
at that point: if they did, they would be putting their citizens in a highly prejudicial 
transitional period with no agreement at all. But if they also had no opportunity of 
proposing amendments to such an agreement because that could result in the 
agreement not being approved on time, their role in the process would become merely 
accessorial.161 
The “argument from democracy”, as Phillipson calls it, is particularly strong when 
the need for meaningful parliamentary approval is considered in the context of the UK 
constitution: the limitation of the will of the Crown by the UK Parliament is in the 
UK’s very constitutional history.162 It may be that Article 50(3) provides for a two-
year clock, but in constitutional moments of this gravity, it is essential to read that 
provision with regard to the antecedent requirement in Article 50(1). Furthermore, a 
constitutionalist reading of Article 50 includes respect for democracy, a core EU 
value, and the role of parliaments in the withdrawal process must therefore be taken 
seriously. 
In turn, as far as the EU is concerned, it is not enough merely to affirm, 
informally, that “representatives of the European Parliament will be invited” to attend 
preparatory meetings in the withdrawal negotiations.163 Nor is it enough to say, in 
general terms, that “the Union negotiator will be invited to keep the European 
Parliament closely and regularly informed throughout the negotiation”, that “the 
Presidency of the Council will be prepared to inform and exchange views with the 
European Parliament before and after each meeting of the General Affairs Council”, 
and that “the President of the European Parliament will be invited to be heard at the 
beginning of meetings of the European Council”.164 Ultimately, such statements 
suggest that the role of the European Parliament in the process depends on the 
goodwill of the Union negotiator. In itself, that does not contravene the explicit terms 
of Article 50. But if, then, the only formal, institutional role that is envisaged for the 
European Parliament in Article 50 is its possibility to veto the agreement, that power 
could not be exercised freely, absent a suspensive effect. 
Indeed, it must be emphasized that withdrawal is a special case, from a 
constitutional vantage point: there is no parallelism between this process and other 
agreements in which the Parliament might exercise its veto power after informal 
consultations in similar fashion, for the result of leaving without any agreement at all 
on this occasion could have far greater consequences for a significant number of EU 
161 See Edward at al., op. cit. supra note 80, paras. 22 et seq. 
162 Phillipson, op. cit. supra note 96 at 1087; R v. Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte 
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citizens directly affected by the agreement detailing the future relationship. Moreover, 
an exit from the EU without a withdrawal agreement changes the law in the most 
fundamental of ways: the Treaties simply no longer apply. By contrast, a refusal by 
the European Parliament to give its consent to any other agreement which requires 
this (see Art. 218(6) TFEU), does not change the law. No new international 
commitments are entered into in the absence of such consent. 
For the same reasons, we also consider that the withdrawal agreement may itself 
regulate the date at which the UK leaves the EU, and could therefore provide for a 
transition beyond the two-year period. Moreover, if the ECJ were to be asked for its 
opinion on the compatibility of the withdrawal agreement with the Treaties (Art. 
218(11) TFEU), respect for the rule of law would require that the withdrawal process 
is suspended, again if necessary beyond the two-year period. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The constitutional questions at stake in the process of withdrawing from the EU are of 
the utmost importance for the Union’s construction. As we have sought to 
demonstrate, it is essential to read Article 50 from a constitutionalist viewpoint: its 
context is one of constitutionalization and its implications will mark national 
constitutions and the post-national constitutional structure of the EU at the most basic 
level, irrespective of whether one considers it a radically pluralist, unifying federal, or 
more mildly integrationist one. Article 50 raises important constitutional concerns not 
only for the withdrawing State - an issue that thrives in the UK blogosphere - but also 
from the perspective of the EU and its identity as a new legal order that creates rights 
and duties for individuals, and safeguards them through accountable institutions, 
rather than being merely an international treaty signed by States. 
It must be added that the current political discourse on withdrawal, particularly in 
the UK, stands in stark contrast with a constitutionalist approach to Article 50. The 
process is spoken of in purely intergovernmental terms, with the overriding aim of 
reaching the "best deal for Britain", particularly in respect of economic 
implications.165 Such a discourse completely disregards the fact that Brexit involves 
this seismic shock to individual rights - a shock whose severity depends on the 
outcome of the Article 50 process. That process, in turn, is by definition concerned 
not with the best deal for Britain, but with respect for the EU constitutional order - an 
order that, up until withdrawal, still includes the UK. Similarly, while on the EU side 
politics has taken charge in the aftermath of the referendum, that is happening mainly 
in the intergovernmental structure of the European Council rather than following the 
constitutional processes and ideals of integration that characterized the drafting 
context of Article 50. The position of prominent EU figures has occasionally been one 
of efficiency and expedience, even if it results in a “hard Brexit”.166 Yet, how hard 
Brexit can be does not just depend on political power in the negotiations and a drive 
to maintain the Union’s stability, but also on the legal constraints resulting from the 
EU Treaties and case law, as analysed above. 
A constitutionalist reading of Article 50 thus brings into sharper relief the fact that 
the withdrawal process cannot be one that is entirely at the mercy of politics. It is 
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governed by specific constitutional constraints on the EU side as well. Ultimately, 
what makes a constitutionalist rather than a purely intergovernmental approach to 
Article 50 most appealing is that the constitutional orders of the UK and the EU 
converge on many of the most crucial constitutional issues. Legislation not only in the 
EU but also in the UK protects against the use of nationality as a discriminatory 
premise.167 Furthermore, UK courts have so far been deeply mindful of the need to 
respect acquired rights and legal certainty.168 
It would be flawed to assume that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU can be 
carried out in the absence of consideration of the constitutional dimensions of the EU, 
except only partially and temporarily. After all, the constitutional order of the EU 
stems from the common traditions of its Member States: it is neither autonomous nor 
created in a contextual vacuum. It is premised on respect for national constitutions, 
fundamental rights, and democratic values. It is indeed the product of years of 
integration between the ECHR, the constitutions of the Member States and the goals 
that these have over time entrusted the EU with safeguarding169 Our suggestions are 
therefore far from revolutionary. They entail, rather, respect for basic and highly 
convergent constitutional structures that have underpinned the relationship between 
the UK and the EU so far. They can be subsumed under the rubric of the rule of law 
and commitment to the democratic process. Failure to respect them at any point 
during the withdrawal process raises serious concerns for both EU and UK 
constitutional law. 
167 Equality Act 2010, s9(1)b. This provision includes “nationality” in the definition of race, a protected 
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